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An Offensive Mark on Offensive Lines: The
Question of Violating the First Amendment
Through the Cancellation of the Washington
Redskins' Trademark
by GABRIELA M. KIRKLAND*
Introduction
During the course of the 2010 National League Division Series, the
Atlanta Braves, a Major League Baseball team, played against the San
Francisco Giants.' During the post-season series, Giants fans quickly
became familiar with the "tomahawk chop."2 Adopted in the early 1990s,
the "tomahawk chop" consists of Braves fans "hold[ing] foam tomahawkS3
when doing a chopping motion, and ... sing[ing] a wordless 'war chant' in
tandem with the chop during athletic events."4
The discussion surrounding team names and mascots derived from
Native Americans, alone, is quickly growing into a contentious debate.
These depictions of Native Americans and their customs and its people
pose an offensive threat to their culture-a culture that seeks to uphold and
honor its tumultuous heritage.
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A. 2013,
University of San Francisco. I wish to thank the Executive Board and Staff Editors of Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly for their dedication to scholarship, attention to detail, and the
friendship they have provided me for the past two years. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
especially my mother, Carole Ann Kirkland, Ph.D., who instilled a love of writing in me at an
early age and has been my strongest support throughout my entire education.
1. 2010 MLB Postseason Schedule, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/schedule/ps.jsp?y-10
(last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
2. L.V. Anderson, When Did People Start Doing the Tomahawk Chop?, SLATE (Sept. 26,
2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_andpolitics/explainer/2012/09/originsof
the_tomahawk-chopscottbrown_s_staffersmockingelizabeth warren are continuinga long
tradition_ html.




At the forefront of this ongoing dilemma as to whether to change an
arguably-yet subjectively opined-offensive team name depicting Native
Americans is the Washington Redskins5 ("Redskins") team name. The
Washington Redskins team name, adopted in 1933, is currently viewed as
"derogatory, disparaging, and offensive" to the Native American culture
and heritage due to its image of a Native American chief as the primary
logo that is featured on the team's helmets.6
As a result, people of the Native American culture are vehemently
voicing their concern regarding this name. Seven Native Americans took
action and filed a trademark cancellation request in, what came to be
known as, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. to the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board ("TTAB").7 The respondent in that case (Pro-Football, Inc.) argued
that petitioners' arguments "abridge[d] [its] right to freedom of speech
provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution"8 and
that "respondent's registered marks are a form of speech protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus cannot be
regulated or cancelled merely because these petitioners may find them
objectionable."9  However, the TTAB determined that it lacked the
authority to make a constitutional determination of the Lanham Act
provisions.0 Therefore, the First Amendment argument was not addressed
at that time in litigation.
Given the arguments in Harjo and the ultimate ruling that the TTAB
lacked the authority to make a constitutionality determination," the
question of whether the government could actually regulate the registration
of disparaging marks became a topic of concern for similar and related
cases. In its 2015 holding of In re Tam,12 the Federal Circuit held that,
despite "personal feelings about the mark at issue [t]here, or other
disparaging marks, the First Amendment forbids government regulators to
5. 1 will, hereafter, refer to the Washington Redskins as the "Washington Redskins" and
"Redskins" interchangeably.
6. Julie A. Hopkins & Thomas M. Joraanstad, Article, Challenge-Flag Thrown: The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's Cancellation of the Redskins' Trademarks and Pro-
Football's Chances on Appeal, 10 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 271 (2015); Sports Logo History,
Washington Redskins Primary Logo, http://sportslogohistory.com/washington-redskins-primary-
logo/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
7. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
8. Id. at 1830.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1833.
11. See id.
12. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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deny registration because they find the speech likely to offend others."
This decision was momentous to Pro-Football's argument in its own
ongoing litigation regarding the Washington Redskins team name.14 While
the holding in In re Tam is not binding on the Fourth Circuit (the court,
which is now considering the cancellation of the Redskins' trademark
registration), it sets up a new and surprising precedent that inquires
whether a disparaging mark exclusion is a viewpoint-based denial of
protection for private speakers' speech, which would be in violation of the
First Amendment.'5
This Note comes at an exciting point in the Washington Redskins'
litigation process. In early October 2016, the Supreme Court announced
that it will not grant the Washington Redskins' appeal concerning the
constitutionality of revoking its trademark designated by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). 16  However, the Washington
Redskins have another parallel case in Lee v. Tam,'7 that the team can use
to bolster their argument and possibly win their case through a lower court
in the future. This is because, in both cases, the respective plaintiffs argue
that it is unconstitutional for the government to reject trademark rights for
offensive speech.
As of this Note, the Supreme Court Justices have heard oral
arguments in Lee v. Tam, on whether the name of a rock band (The Slants)
is considered offensive.'8  The Washington Redskins could use the
Supreme Court's future judgment, if favorable, to strengthen and backup
their case in future litigation through the Fourth Circuit.
In Part I, this Note will provide the history of offensive trademarks in
American sports. This history will include a brief look at the usage of
other Native American terms in team sports names, from the Boston
Braves to the Florida State University Seminoles. This part will also
provide a history of the Washington Redskins' name. Although the
13. Id. at 1358 (emphasis added).
14. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
15. Eugene Volokh, Federal Appeals Court Decides 'The Slants' Case: Excluding
'Disparaging Marks'from Trademark Registration Violates the First Amendment, WASH. POST
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/22/feder
al-appeals-court-decides-the-slants-case-excluding-disparaging-marks-from-trademark-
registration-violates-the-first-amendment/.
16. Jason Diamond, Supreme Court Won't Hear Washington Redskins Trademark Appeal,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/sports/washington-redskins-
trademark-appeal-denied-by-supreme-court-w443144.
17. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
18. Trump's Supreme Court Nominee Set o Bring Conservative Vote Back to SCOTUS
Cases, RT.COM (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.rt.com/usa/375854-trump-scotus-nominee-cases/.
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reasoning behind the choice of name remains unclear,'9 the history behind
the team's creation is nonetheless interesting. Part II will analyze the
precedential cases that have led the Washington Redskins to where they are
today in the litigation process. This part will address three main cases:
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo,2 0 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.21 and its
more recent appeal in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse.22 The Blackhorse
litigation and appellate process will be discussed together. Part III will
address the legal questions that were decided in those cases and how these
will shape possible decisions in the future. This part will explain federal
trademark law-more specifically Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act-and
address the question that was presented in the appellate case Pro-Football,
Inc. v. Blackhorse:23 Whether Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the
First Amendment and is, thus, unconstitutional. Part IV will present the
case In re Tam,24 which was recently decided by the Federal Circuit that
changed past precedent on offensive trademarks and now presents an
alternative opinion in this ongoing debate as to whether Section 2(a)
violates the First Amendment. Holding that Section 2(a) is
unconstitutional, In re Tam is persuasive in its reasoning and may influence
the Fourth Circuit, as the Washington Redskins await their appeal. Finally,
Part V will address the newest updates to the Redskins litigation since the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Lee v. Tam and will provide an
analysis regarding the recent oral arguments for the case.
While other notes have addressed similar topics regarding the
Washington Redskins, this Note will examine the possible implications of
the In re Tam decision on future trademark litigation and discuss how the
Supreme Court may alter how it and lower courts will answer this question
of constitutionality. This Note will provide reasoning as to why Section
2(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional and that the Fourth Circuit-and
perhaps the Supreme Court-should follow the Federal Circuit's decision
in In re Tam. The case of the Washington Redskins has captivated many,
and not only those who are directly affected by the name: the fans and
people of the Native American heritage.
Because of In re Tam, the pending appeal before the Supreme Court
has been given a new breath and new opinion on the law. On April 25,
2016, the Washington Redskins filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
19. See infra Part 1(B).
20. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
21. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
22. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015).
23. Id.
24. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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Before Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. The Supreme Court has indicated that it plans to rule on whether
the USPTO has the right to revoke trademark registrations without
violating the First Amendment in In re Tam before the Fourth Circuit
decides on the issue.25 In this filing, the Washington Redskins presented
the following questions to the Court: (1) whether Section 2(a)'s
disparagement clause violates the First Amendment; (2) whether Section
2(a)'s disparagement clause is impermissibly vague, in violation of the
First Amendment; and (3) whether the government's decades-long delay
between registering a trademark and cancelling the registration under
26Section 2(a)'s disparagement clause violates due process. Although the
Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Washington Redskins' case, the
case will proceed as planned to the Fourth Circuit.27 While it is unclear
whether the Fourth Circuit will delay their decision to wait for the Lee v.
Tam decision, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has not
28
delayed the Tam litigation, and presumably wishes resolve the issue.
This Note's conclusion will provide a proposed argument along with a
possible resolution to the continuing litigation. In the past, courts-
including the Supreme Court-try to avoid cases concerning First
Amendment trademark issues. However, given the current denial of
certiorari for the Redskins' case and the granting of certiorari for In re
Tam, it appears that the Court had finally decided the time has come where
it cannot avoid these constitutional questions any longer. It is now
necessary for the Supreme Court to decide and set the precedent for the
lower courts. However, given the recent events surrounding the Tam
litigation, this Note will argue that adjudication of such an argument is
necessary.
25. Ian Shapira, Redskins Urge Supreme Court to Protect Team's Free Speech Rights,
WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/redskins-urge-supreme-
court-to-protect-teams-frec-speech-rights-alongside-slants/2016/07/15/53e6c682-4ab3- 11 e6-
acbc-4d487OaO79da story.html?utm_term=.99ec62495044; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, Ill
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014), petition for cert. filed, U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (2016) (No.
15-1874), http://www.sco tusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Redskins-petition-5-25-
16.pdf.
26. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014), petition
for cert. filed, U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (2016) (No. 15-1874), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Redskins-petition-5-25-16.pdf.
27. Prof Christine Farley 's Statement the Supreme Court's Denial of Cert. in the
REDSKINS Case, AM. U. WASH. C. L. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.pijip.org/2016/10/04/team-
cert-petition-denied/.
28. The Tam litigation has only lasted three years, as opposed to the Washington Redskins'
twenty-four years in court. Id.
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I. History of Offensive Marks in American Sports
A. The Usage of Other Native American Terms in Team Sports
While progress has been made over the last fifty years in support to
end "the era of racist and harmful 'Indian' mascots in sports and popular
culture,"29 it is obvious that these names are still being used and are readily
recognizable not only in the sports community but also within the general
public. The longstanding history of these teams' names makes it difficult
for the teams to suddenly change their names, given their respective fans
and traditions. Some of these team names harken back to the very
beginning of the 20th century. For example, in 1912, the Boston
"Beaneaters" [sic]-now Atlanta Braves-changed its name to the Boston
Braves, becoming one of the first professional sports teams to use a Native
American term as its team name.30 Since that change in 1912, the usage of
Native American terms for team names has increased exponentially with
over 3,000 teams (ranging from high school to professional sports teams)
using these cultural names.3'
Despite the prevalence and popularity among teams to adopt these
Native American terms, the National Congress of American Indians
("NCAI") reported that the adoption of new mascots that use racial
stereotypes in their names and imagery ceased in 1963.32 In 2005, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") established an
"extensive policy" to remove "Indian" mascots from college sports teams,
causing high schools to enact the same removal of such mascots and
names.33 However, it is important to note that although the NCAA sought
to do away with the stereotyping of the Native American culture, it granted
a waiver to the Florida State University Seminoles, whose mascot name
dates back to 1947 and which the university boasts was originally
29. Ending the Era of Harmful "Indian" Mascots, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/proudtobe (last visited Apr. 2, 2016); see also San Francisco
Chronicle Bans 'Redskins' From Print, USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 2015, 10:46 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2013/10/30/sf-chronicle-to-stop-using-
redskins-in-print/3320657/ ("The San Francisco Chronicle has joined a growing list of
publications that will no longer use the term 'Redskins' when referring to Washington's NFL
team.").
30. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 269.
31. Id. at 270.
32. Ending the Legacy of Racism in Sports & the Era of Harmful "Indian" Sports Mascots,
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (Oct. 2013), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-
publications/EndingtheLegacyof Racism.pdf.
33. Id.
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"conceived with input from the Seminole Tribe of Florida."34 The NCAA
granted a waiver to Florida State University because of that consultation.
In this partnership, the Seminole Tribe even worked with the college to
create a regalia that represents the heritage Florida State portrays in
donning a team uniform with the term "Seminoles." Thus, because of the
tribe's involvement in the team name, there appeared to be implicit
approval of this particular usage of a Native American name for a team.
Although the NCAA allowed this exception to Florida State
University, the National Football League ("NFL") has not extended a
similar waiver to the Washington Redskins.37 Applying this exception to
the Florida State Seminoles-a college NCAA team-implies that
professional sports teams are to be held to a higher standard to uphold the
integrity of heritages and not promote offensive names.
If this standard is true and a proper interpretation of such an
exception, a question remains: Why hold professional sports teams to a
higher standard and provide an exception to a college sports team? While
the college team may not be on the same caliber or reach the same
demographic (fan-base wise) in society, the seemingly offensive name is,
arguably, promoted to a younger generation of people. It sends the
message to students attending the institution, that he or she must condone
or support the term to support the college team. Accepting the offensive
name of their school's team may cause them to take these beliefs with them
when they graduate. If a term is to be considered offensive on one scale, it
must be considered offensive on another. Otherwise, there will always
been a contradiction between the different sports team organizations
(NCAA, NFL, and Major League Baseball) as to what term should be
allowed or not allowed. To avoid such inconsistencies, uniformity among
the different organizations should be required on a moral level.
B. History of the Washington Redskins Name
The Redskins team was originally founded in New England by
George Preston Marshall ("Marshall").38  Marshall's interest in athletics
34. Id.; Chuck Culpepper, Florida State's Unusual Bond with Seminole Tribe Puts Mascot





37. Culpepper, supra note 34 ("The same NCAA that aimed to scrub away the stereotyping
granted a waiver to Florida State in 2005. It cited unique circumstances.").
38. THOMAS G. SMITH, SHOWDOWN: JFK AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE WASHINGTON
REDSKINS 1 (2012).
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grew throughout his youth and continued as he climbed the social ladder in
both New York and Washington, D.C. Eventually, Marshall approached
the NFL about potentially investing in a professional football franchise.39
After being awarded an NFL franchise in Boston, Marshall was determined
to succeed." "For Marshall, a football game meant more than athletic
competition; it also meant pageantry, drama, and thrilling family
entertainment."4 1  Therefore, football went beyond the game that was
played on the field. For Marshall, football was about the history and the
camaraderie between teammates and their fans. It held a deeper meaning.
On July 6, 1933, a newspaper headline in Boston read, "Football
Braves Become Redskins."42 The Washington football team-then called
"The Braves"-moved to Fenway Park in Boston, Massachusetts and
changed its name to "The Redskins."43 While the choice of name and
cause for change still remains unclear, the Boston Globe then reported the
change to "Redskins" was in response to "keeping with a plan . .. to 'sign
up a number of Indian players' and befitting a team that played its games in
'The Wigwam."'4
Although the true origin of the word, "Redskin" is in dispute, "early
historical records indicate that 'Redskin' was used as a self-identifier by
Native Americans to differentiate between themselves and the Americans."
45 It was also used when Native Americans negotiated with the French and,
later, Americans.46
Even if the general public were provided with adequate reasoning for
the name choice, this name, and subsequent trademark, has come under
intense scrutiny, as many Native Americans consider this name and
representation to be derogatory to their heritage.4 However, the
Washington Redskins' team owner, Daniel Snyder, does not view the team
39. Id. at 3, 5.
40. Id at 6, 9.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Kevin Paul Dupont, Redskins Name Debate Traces to Boston, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec.
29, 2013), hups://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2013/12/29/redskins-wonder-what-name-the-ans
wer-traces-back-boston/GmfYbPTnHxlHt5NgqNIEOM/story.html.
43. History by the Decades, REDSKINS.COM, http://www.redskins.com/team/history/history
-by-decades.html.
44. Dupont, supra note 42.
45. Lakshmi Gandhi, Are You Ready for Some Controversy? The History of 'Redskin,' NPR
(Sept. 9, 2013, 10:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/09/09/220654611/are-
you-ready-for-some-controversy-the-history-of-redskin.
46. Id
47. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 271.
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name in the same light as many of the general public does currently.48 As
presented by Julie A. Hopkins and Thomas M. Joraanstad,49 although
Native American groups and many non-Native Americans believe that the
name should be removed due to its representation of an oppressed culture
in American history, Snyder does not believe that the term "redskin(s)" is
offensive and refuses to change the name.50 This refusal has not stopped
protestors from voicing their disdain for the name.1  Protestors chant
"'Rethink,' 'Replace,' and 'Rename,"' and Native American protestors
proclaim, "'We are people, not your mascots."'52 However, this ongoing
debate is not completely one-sided. Fans of the name make their beliefs
known to the public in chanting, "keep the name" during similar situations
and protests.53  The public is very divided on this issue and this same
divide is reflected in the courts, as well.
II. The "Training" and Past Courtroom Rivalries
A. The Harjo Litigation
In 1992, seven Native Americans filed a cancellation petition with the
TTAB in "arguing that six trademarks containing the term 'redskin(s)' and
owned by Pro-Football, Inc. violated the Lanham Act's prohibition of
marks that disparaged persons or brought them into contempt or
disrepute."5 This cancellation petition "represented the first opportunity
48. Id.; see also Erik Brady, Daniel Snyder Says Redskins Will Never Change Name, USA
TODAY (May 9, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/redskins/2013/05/09/
washington-redskins-daniel-snyder/2148127.
49. Julie A. Hopkins holds a B.A. from Smith College and a J.D. from the University of
Maryland Carey School of Law. She is a Partner and Chair of the Intellectual Property Practice
Group at Tydings & Rosenberg, LLP where she practices all areas of intellectual property law
including patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Thomas M. Joraanstad holds a B.A. from
Occidental College and a J.D. from William & Mary Law School. He is an associate, practicing
corporate and intellectual property law, at Tydings & Rosenberg, LLP.
50. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 271; see also Brady, supra note 48 (.'We'll
never change the name,' [Daniel Snyder] said. 'It's that simple. NEVER-you can use caps."').
51. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 268 (citing John Woodrow Cox, At FedEx





53. Chris Lingebach, Keep the Name' Chant Drowns Out Dan Snyder at Redskins Rally in
Houston, CBS DC (Sept. 6, 2014, 11:16 PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/09/06/keep-
the-name-chant-drowns-out-dan-snyder-at-redskins-rally-in-houston/.
54. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 279; see Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
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for the TTAB to determine whether a mark disparaged a racial or ethnic
group."5 5 In Harjo, the petitioners argued that the "term 'Redskins' rarely
appears in formal writing, such as judicial decisions, scholarly
dissertations, government documents, or papers of diplomacy, where such
terms as 'uncivilized' and 'savages' frequently appeared," indicating its
56derogatory nature. The petitioners further alleged that the term
"Redskins," historically, has been reserved for "informal writings as a slur
of the most demeaning sort and as an epithet to influence the sensibilities
of the general public."57 The petitioners emphasized that he use of the
term in informal contexts, instead of formal, indicates that it is
inappropriate for public consumption and commercialization (such as a
team name).
In response to these assertions, the TTAB clarified that "whether the
marks at issue are disparaging is based on the disparaging nature of the
marks when the respective registrations were issued, and not whether the
marks are considered disparaging in present society."ss To determine
whether or not a trademark is considered disparaging under Section 2(a),
the TTAB looks to the "beliefs of the identifiable group" only, instead of
society as a whole.59  Therefore, only the "opinions of those individuals
[actually] in the identifiable group" would be the "only relevant points of
view as to whether the term was disparaging."6 To determine this, the
TTAB developed a two-part test, which became the standard and reference
in evaluating whether or not a trademark's registration should be barred for
being disparaging.6 1
After taking the two-part test into consideration, the TTAB
determined that the petitioners established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the term "Redskins"-"as used in Pro-Football's marks in
connection with its goods and services"-disparaged Native Americans.6 2
The identifiable group was composed of a "substantial composite" of
Native Americans.63 Thus, the petitioners' arguments in that case are very
similar to the argument being raised and questioned today: Is the use of the
55. Id.
56. Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1705.
57. Id.
58. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 279 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 279-80 ("[T]he TTAB stated that 'scandalous' and 'disparage' as used in Section
2(a) represented different statutory bars, holding that 'scandalous' looked to society as a whole,
while 'disparage' looked only to the beliefs of the identifiable group.").
60. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
61. See infra Part 111(A).
62. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 280.
63. Id.; Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1747.
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term "Redskins" in an official team name comparable to using a racial slur
in an official team name?6
In response, Pro-Football brought a civil action suit appealing the
TTAB's decision in Harjo.65 Through a subsequent series of appeals, a
federal district court overturned the TTAB's decision.6 6  However, this
decision was in part based upon a finding that "the doctrine of laches
barred the plaintiffs from bringing their claim."67  Further appeals were
68
made, but the Supreme Court denied granting certiorari, which now
allows the Redskins to maintain their trademark protection for the time
being.
69
B. The Blackhorse Litigation
Concurrent with the Harjo litigation, "five Native Americans [also]
filed a cancellation petition . .. [again] seeking cancellation of the same six
trademarks" that contained the term "Redskins" on the grounds that the
trademarks "were disparaging to Native Americans and thus barred from
registration."7 0  The Blackhorse litigation ultimately concluded in the
TTAB's cancellation of all six trademarks on the grounds that the term
"Redskins"-as used in connection with the goods and services offered by
the mark-disparaged the Native Americans and their culture.71
In this decision, "the TTAB reiterated that a 'substantial composite' of
the referenced group must find the mark as used disparaging."72 The only
question in this case, however, was whether the term "Redskins" was
disparaging at the time of the respective registrations.73 To answer this, the
TTAB grouped the petitioners' evidence into two categories: "(1) general
analysis of the term ['R]edskin(s)[']; and (2) specific views of the
64. See Alicia Jessup, Inside the Legal Fight to Change the Washington Redskins' Name,
FORBES (Oct. 15, 2013, 8:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/10/15/a-look-
at-the-legal-fight-to-change-the-washington-redskins-name/#4e570551405a.
65. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2003).
66. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on remand, 567 F. Supp. 2d
46 (D.D.C. 2008), aff'd on laches ground, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Pro-Football, Inc. v.
Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
67. Jessup, supra note 64.
68. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 565 U.S. 880, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1025 (2009).
69. Jessup, supra note 64.
70. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 283 (emphasis added); Blackhorse v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
71. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 283-84; Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at *29.
72. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 284; Blackhorse, 11I U.S.P.Q.2d at *10.
73. Blackhorse, 111 IU.S.P.Q.2d at * 10.
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referenced group."74 This evidence focused particularly on "expert
testimony, dictionary definitions, and reference books in the first
category."7  For the second category, the petitioners' main piece of
evidence was the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") 1993
Resolution.76
In 1993, the members of the NCAI passed a resolution against the
Redskins team name and titled the resolution, "Resolution in Support of the
Petition for Cancellation of the Registered Service Marks of the
Washington Redsk*ns [sic] AKA Pro-Football, Inc."77 The TTAB rejected
Pro-Football's argument that this resolution was irrelevant because "it was
not passed during the pertinent time period," reasoning that the "mere fact
that an opinion is voiced in 1993 does not mean the opinion was not held
by that group or individual in the 1967-1990 time period."78
Focusing on the NCAI's Resolution, the TTAB found that "at a
minimum approximately thirty percent of Native Americans found the term
[redskin(s)] used in connection with [Pro-Football's] services to be
disparaging' in the relevant time period, and furthermore, that thirty
percent is 'without a doubt a substantial composite."79  In a two-to-one
vote, the TTAB concluded that the trademarks should be cancelled.80 This
decision sparked the recent litigation and the question with which society is
now posed: Does the cancellation of a trademark's registration violate the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
III. Legal Questions Surrounding the Change
A. Federal Trademark Law
Federal trademark law is "[o]ne of the most promising methods of
action against the use of disparaging sports logos is through federal
trademark law."81  "Trademark rights are rooted in common law." 82
Because a symbol "must actually have been used as a trademark before
74. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 285-86.
75. Id. at 286.
76. Id.
77. Ending the Legacy ofRacism in Sports & the Era ofHarmful "Indian" Sports Mascots,
supra note 32.
78. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 286; Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at *18.
79. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at *29 (internal citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. John R. Wallace, Note, Discriminatory & Disparaging Team Names, Logos, &
Mascots: Workable Challenges & the Misapplication of the Doctrine of Laches, 12 RUTGERS
RACE & L. REv. 203, 216 (2011).
82. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 272.
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there is anything to register," the United States is known as a "'used-based'
trademark nation."83 Due to failed attempts at a federal scheme to regulate
trademarks, "Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946, in part, to
encourage federal registration and centralization of trademarks."84 The Act
governs trademark and unfair competition law. 5
The Lanham Act and, thus, federal trademark law, allows people to
register their marks, which ultimately gives the owners legal protection and
remedies when trademark infringement occurs.86 The Lanham Act also
allows for the cancellation of trademarks. Section 2(a) provides in
pertinent part:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it ... [c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or
bring them into contempt, or disrepute ... .87
While a mark registration may be refused under this provision,
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act does not hinder the holder's opportunity to
appeal the decision of the TTAB. 88 Following a refusal for registration,
"the Federal Circuit will review the TTAB's decision using the record of
the underlying TTAB proceeding."89 Therefore, the Federal Circuit does
not permit any additional evidence during a TTAB appeal.90 If the
aggrieved party remains unsatisfied with the decision, it may appeal the
Federal Circuit's decision to the Supreme Court.91
83. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 19:1.25 (4th ed. 2017).
84. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 272.
85. Alex Butterman, What the Trademark Ruling on the Washington Redskins Means for
Business, HUFFPOST BuSINESS (Jan. 26, 2016, 3:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/quora/what-the-trademark-ruling_b_9081272.html.
86. Volokh, supra note 15.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2016), held unconstitutional in In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
88. Hopkins & Joraanstad, supra note 6, at 273.
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This was the case in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.92 In Blackhorse,
the TTAB found that the petitioners established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that "the term 'Redskins' was disparaging of Native Americans,
when used in relation to professional football services, at the times the
* 93various registrations involved in the cancellation proceeding were issued.
A disparaging mark is a mark, which "dishonors by comparison with what
is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust
comparison."94 To determine if a mark is disparaging under Section 2(a), a
trademark examiner considers:
(1) What is the likely meaning of the matter in question,
taking into account not only dictionary definitions, but also
the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the
mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner
in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection
with the goods or services; and
(2) If that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that
meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of
the referenced group. s
Why does the current litigation about the use of the term "Redskins"
have merit? The current litigation exists and has merit because the TTAB
did not address the question of whether the Redskins name is disparaged
now in Blackhorse.96 It was a question of whether the Redskins name was
92. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., I11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
93. Media Fact Sheet: Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) Decision in Blackhorse
v. Pro Football, Inc. (TTAB Cancellation No. 92046185), USPTO (June 18, 2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/USPTOOfficialFactSheetonTTABdecision
inBlackhorse_v_ProFootball_lnc.pdf.
94. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014)) (internal citations omitted).
95. Id. at 1331 (citing Trademark Manual of Exam. Proc. § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.)).
96. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 35 (T.T.A.B. 2014)
(Bergsman, J., dissenting)
To be clear, this case is not about the controversy, currently playing out in
the media, over whether the term "redskins," as the name of Washington's
professional football team, is disparaging to Native Americans today . . ..
[The narrower legal question is] whether the evidence made of record in this
case establishes that the term "redskins" was disparaging to a substantial
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"disparaging to a substantial composite of Native Americans" at the time
that the registrations being challenged were issued.97
Although Judge Lee98 does not agree with this argument,9 the
Washington Redskins state that a "vast majority" of Native Americans had
no objection to the Redskins name when the trademarks were granted
between the years 1967 and 1990.'" Appealing this decision, the
Washington Redskins argued that the TTAB's ruling violated free speech,
which is an argument that has given this ongoing debate and case a new
life.101
B. The First Amendment Play
1. The First Amendment
Generally, the government cannot prohibit expression of an idea on
the ground that the idea itself or the way in which it was expressed is
considered to be highly offensive to people.102 As provided in Texas v.
Johnson, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."103 Because
of this principle underlying the First Amendment, any time that the
government attempts to justify a restriction on expression simply because
of its possible derogatory nature, that poses a problem to speech used in
society as a whole.'04
In its appeal of the 2014 TTAB decision, Pro-Football, Inc. argued
that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech."05
When looking at the disparagement provision and determining that the
TTAB discriminates based on disapproval of the message, the cancellation
97. Id.
98. Gerald Bruce Lee is a U.S. District Judge for the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Virginia in Alexandria, VA and gave the opinion in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F.
Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015).
99. See infra Part IV.
100. Ian Shapira, Federal Judge Orders Cancellation of Redskins' Trademark Registrations,
WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/judge-upholds-cancellation-
of-redskins-trademarks-in-a-legal-and-symbolic-setback-for-team/2015/07/08/5a65424e-le6c-
11 e5-aeb9-a41 I a84c9d55_story.html.
101. Id
102. Robert A. Sedler, Disparaging Trademarks and the First Amendment, JURIST (Jan. 13,
2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2016/0 1/robert-sedler-first-amendment.php.
103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
104. See Sedler, supra note 102.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Complaint, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 2014 WL
4719977 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14 2014) (No. 1:14CV01043-GBL-IDD).
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of the registration of a trademark is not content or viewpoint neutral.106
"Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid,"107 as they target
speech on its communicative content. As a result, they only "may be
justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests."108
2. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse
Reviewing Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, de novo, Judge Lee
found that the plaintiff, Pro-Football, Inc., did not have a viable claim that
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated the First Amendment.'0
Consequently, the TTAB was authorized to cancel the registration of the
Redskins' trademarks because the term may be disparaging to Native
Americans."o In the court's determination that Section 2(a) does not
violate the First Amendment, Judge Lee reasoned that he cancelation of
the registration does not actually prohibit the owner from continuing to use
the mark.111
The plaintiff in Pro-Football, Inc. first argued that Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act restricts protected speech.1 12 However, the court held that,
because the trademark owner can still use the mark, the law does not
"prohibit[] or penalize[] any speech."1l 3 In its reasoning, the court relied
heavily on the recent Supreme Court decision in Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.114 In that case, the Supreme Court
invoked the "government speech" doctrine to hold that Texas was entitled
to refuse the request of the Sons of Confederate Veterans featuring a
106. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
107. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
108. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) ("[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
109. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015).
110. Id.at455.
111. Id.; see also Roberta L. Horton & Michael E. Kientzle, The Ongoing Dispute Over the
Redskins Name, 11 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 15 (2015).
112. Horton, supra note 111. I will not be addressing the Due Process and Disparagement
claims in detail, in order to focus on the First Amendment for the purposes of this Note.
113. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 455 (E.D. Va. 2015) ("The
present case does not concern a statute that prohibits or penalizes any speech as Section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act does not restrict one's ability to engage in a particular form of speech.").
114. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc. and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc. were decided within about a month of each other.
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Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.!15 The court in Pro-
Football, Inc. relied on the "government speech" doctrine and stated that
this form of "speech" was not barred by the Free Speech Clause because,
when government speaks, it is not barred by this clause from "determining
the content of what it says."'16 Thus meaning, the government is exempt
from such a bar on speech. With this idea in mind, Judge Lee likened the
license plates in Walker to the trademark registration for the Washington
Redskins and determined that trademark registration is also government
speech.1 17  The court allowed the USPTO to deny registration to the
Redskins on the belief that the mark is considered offensive, "just as Texas
could deny acceptance of a Confederate license plate on the ground that the
Confederate flag is deemed offensive."18
3. Analysis and Moving Forward in This Approach
I agree with the position that there is a flaw in Judge Lee's analysis.1 9
The holdings in Walker and Blackhorse allow private speech to be deemed
government speech, thereby creating an immediate bar against any First
Amendment issues and setting a dangerous precedent, as this would curtail
what can be said in the general public.120
The holding in Walker is not comparable to the case at hand.
Trademark registration, unlike a license plate in Walker, is not a
representation of a state or a government's point of view.121 While one
could argue that the registration of the Washington Redskins trademark is
acting as a state-endorsement of the team and its choice in name and/or
logo, the stronger argument remains that the registration of a trademark
does not imply that a particular state or the federal government has
endorsed the logo.122
The ultimate determination is up to the individual fans and public, as
they-not the government-choose whether to represent the team by
donning the logo and chanting the team name. Just as people can choose to
115. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2253.
116. Id at 2241 (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-468 (2009))
(internal citations omitted).
117. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Washington Redskins Trademark Decision Violates the




120. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2254 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 2249 ("Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs.").
122. See id
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follow, support, or appreciate certain artists, people can choose to follow,
support, or appreciate certain sports teams. To say that the registration of a
trademark indicates some degree of government endorsement, would call
into question many names-as it does not seem that the government would
want to "endorse" already-approved registered trademarks like,
"Dangerous Negro shirts," "Dago Swagg Clothing,"12 3 "Baked By A Negro
bakery goods," and more.124 When presented with these names, it is hard
to believe that the government would endorse these trademarks merely
because they are registered marks. Conversely, these trademark
registration approvals imply that trademark registration is based on private
speech, which is protected by the First Amendment and should not be
treated as government speech. No one would believe that these marks
reflect any type of approval or endorsement by the government. Further,
the idea that the government "routinely registers pornographers' marks,"
also implies that none of these approvals can be deemed government
speech. 125
The registration of trademarks-like copyrights and patents-cannot
be compared to a government loan, grant, issuance of a license plate, or
any other type of government allowance.126 In the registration process of a
trademark, the government looks to see if the trademark meets statutory
criteria (namely, being distinctive), thus entitling the trademark to legal
protection from infringement by other private parties.127 To ban
trademarks simply for "disparaging" content would "unconstitutionally
burden[] speech based on content and viewpoint," which would be
comparable to denying the registration of copyrights for "disparaging"
books.128
123. "Dago" is a highly-derogatory racial slur for Italians. But compare Change the Mascot
Campaign Fact Sheet, CHANGETHEMASCOT.ORG, http://www.changethemascot.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/ChangeTheMascotFactSheet20l6.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2017),
where it states the U.S. Government Labels the R-Word as a Racial Slur: On top of dictionaries
defining the R- word as a racial slur, the U.S. government officially went on record saying the
same thing in 2014. In early 2014, the U.S. Patent Office twice declared that the word is
derogatory. If the term Redskins is considered a racial slur and, thus, not suitable for trademark
registration, the same line of reasoning should be applied to other racial slurs.






496 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 44:4
AN OFFENSIVE MARK ON OFFENSIVE LINES
4. The Argument Against Commercial Speech
Trademark law and the First Amendment cannot be analyzed in such a
simple approach, however. There are complications. "Analyzing the
Lanham Act's anti-disparagement provision under the First Amendment
raises particularly difficult questions, both because speech law is so
complex and because trademark law is so nuanced."l29 As stated in Part
III, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act looks at both the disparaging elements
of the speech and the "nature of the goods or services, and the manner in
which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or
services 130 Arguably, trademarks could fall under commercial
speech, because "[trademarks] indicate the source of the good for sale."l3 1
In this indication of the source of a good, they "aid consumers in making
their purchasing decisions." 32
If the Washington Redskins trademark constituted commercial speech,
the speech would be less protected than other constitutionally protected
speech.133 The test would be that of intermediate scrutiny, as opposed to
strict scrutiny for non-commercial speech. Under Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissioner of New York, false or
misleading commercial speech may be banned.134 In Central Hudson, the
Court established a four-part test where "[the Court] must determine
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment."135  To
determine whether commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the commercial speech
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next [the Court] ask[s] whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, [the Court] must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the interest asserted, and
129. Zachary S. O'Driscoll, The Mascot Manifesto: Challenging the Constitutionality of
Section 2(a) ofthe Lanham Act in a Heightened Era ofPolitical Correctness, 45 CAP. U. L. REV.
161, 163-64 (2017) (quoting Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L.
REv. 1639, 1640 (2016)).
130. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Trademark Manual of Exam.
Proc. § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.)).
131. Snow, supra note 129, at 1645-46.
132. Id.
133. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
134. See id
135. Id. at 566.
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whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.36
However, this test need not even apply in determining the First
Amendment protection of the Washington Redskins trademark. The
Central Hudson test would not be applied to the actual trademark, but he
expressive speech arising from the trademark. The disparagement
exclusion would be because of the expressive content of the Washington
Redskins trademark and not because the trademark identifies the
Washington Redskins. If the trademark registration is cancelled, it is being
denied based on its content and not for its commercial value. Because this
restriction would be content-based, strict scrutiny must apply in assessing
its protection under the First Amendment.
While it may be argued that source-identifiers are expressive
speech,137 the content of trademark, and thus the disparagement element, is
inherently expressive. Team names are not source-identifiers to a
particular brand, but expressive of a geographical location, history, or
background (e.g., San Francisco 49ers, Green Bay Packers, and New
England Patriots).13 8 Because team names are expressive in their content,
classifying the Redskins trademark as commercial speech ignores the fact
that the cancellation of a trademark inherently requires a subjective
analysis on the expressive content of a team's name.
IV. A New Game Plan in In re Tam
On December 22, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued a ruling that has
provided the Washington Redskins with the persuasive precedent hat they
had been hoping for in this ongoing legal battle.'39 In a nine-to-three vote,
the Federal Circuit held that the exclusion of "disparaging" marks violated
the First Amendment.140
The facts of this case consider similar elements that exist in the
Washington Redskins case currently pending before the Fourth Circuit.
136. Id.
137. Snow, supra note 129, at 1649 ("Not only does the source-identification function of a
mark represent an expressive element of a mark, it represents an expressive element with great
value as speech.")
138. Barry Shuck, NFL: How All 32 Teams Got Their Names, BLEACHER REPORT (June 13,
2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/733872-how-all-32-nfl-teams-got-their-names ("Often,
team nicknames are derived from people, places or things that re indicative of the area's
culture.").
139. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
140. Volokh, supra note 15; see In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1351; see also supra Part III(A)
(defining what is a disparaging mark and the test in determining the status of a possibly
disparaging mark).
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Simon Shiao Tam is the "front man" for an Asian-American "dance-rock"
band, "The Slants," which he named in order to "'reclaim' and 'take
ownership' of Asian stereotypes."4 1 Drawing its name inspiration from
"childhood slurs and mocking nursery rhymes," the band's albums also
include names such as "The Yellow Album" and "Slanted Eyes, Slanted
Hearts," which reflect Tam's general idea of ownership over the Asian
stereotypes.142 "The band 'feel[s] strongly that Asians should be proud of
their cultural heri[ta]ge, and not be offended by stereotypical
descriptions."'l43 Through their lyrics, performances, and band name, Tam
and the band members provide their insights and views on cultural and
political discussions about race and society.'" After being denied
registration by the TTAB, Tam argued that the TTAB erred in finding "The
Slants" name disparaging and ruling that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is
unconstitutional.145 The case was appealed to the Federal Circuit.'" The
Federal Circuit asked the parties to file briefs on the issue whether the bar
141. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331. In comparison to the Redskins' argument, it is important
to note that "The Slants" is a group who is reclaiming a term referencing their own identity, and
the distinction between a rock band and a NFL team.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id Although Tam feels that Asians should be "'proud of their cultural heri[ta]ge, and
not be offended by stereotypical descriptions," Simon Tam has actually been a long-time
supporter of the "Change the Name" campaign. Id.; Jacqueline Keeler, The Slants' Simon Tam:
'Courts Hijacked My Case,' INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, 1 (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2016/01/04/slants-simon-tam-courts-hijacked-my-
case-162956. After the decision of In re Tam was made, Tam agreed to be interviewed to share
his perspective to the ruling and his thoughts on the Native American community, as a result. Id.
In order to be victorious in case, Tam's legal team argued that the Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
prohibition on the registration of disparaging and/or derogatory trademarks was being "unfairly
applied to the very minority communities the law was meant to protect." Id. at 2. He stated that
his case was not originally about free speech, but Judge Kimberly Moore "hijacked" the case to
become one about free speech. Id. Tam believes that it should "be up to community groups to
choose their own identities" and that "[the communities] should have a say in particularly these
things." Id. at 5.
However, this argument does not make sense, as it is saying that oppressed minorities should
have a say in these types of decisions. See id. (In that interview, Tam is quoted as saying, "Asian
Americans were not allowed . . . [and] weren't in control over [their] own destiny. [The Asian
American community] had this random white judge who made that decision for us and that was
the case for many of the cases."). Tam was upset because he was denied his trademark that was
meant to control the Asian stereotype and, thus, control the oppressive nature of the disparaging
term. See id. To say that only the minority-that the disparaging mark represents-can control
how the term is used puts a huge burden on the term. It provides too many limits. Therefore,
concerning the Washington Redskins, the term should not be controlled by the people it
represents, but be judged on a statutory scale to see if it can be approved for registered. Once
registered, whether or not the trademark is used, will be up to the fans.
145. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332.
146. Id
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on the registration of disparaging marks under the Lanham Act violated the
First Amendment.147
In the majority opinion, Judge Moore1 48 stated that Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act denies rights to certain speakers in that the exclusion of
disparaging remarks deprives the owners of important legal rights.149
While Section 2(a) does not, necessarily, ban speech-as people are still
free to use the unregistered marks-it "does deprive marks of protections
that are important to trademark owners and, therefore, tends to discourage
people from using disparaging marks.150  As presented in Perry v.
Sindermann, this type of denial of a benefit to a person because of his or
her constitutionally protected speech would penalize and inhibit that
person's freedoms and produce results that the government would not
support directly.'5' Furthermore, a denial of these benefits also creates a
"serious disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem
offensive or disparaging." 52
Thus, if an applicant thinks there is the possibility that his or her
trademark may be denied registration, canceled immediately, or canceled
later down the line-simply because the government does not agree with
the trademark-a person's creativity is burdened and hindered in fear of
that denial.15 3 Under this approach, the subjective opinion of another will
control a person's interests and ideas. While the argument that a person
can use his mark, even without federal trademark registration is plausible, a
person will be taking a risk in presenting and using his ideas without any
legal protection. Therefore, the fear, alone, (in both being denied
registration for a subjective opinion like disparagement and in having one's
idea stolen without the legal protection that is provided by a federal
trademark registration) creates an unnecessary burden on the mark's owner
that could be avoided, if Section 2(a) is removed from the Lanham Act.
147. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
148. Kimberly Ann Moore is an American federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit and provided the opinion in In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
149. Volokh, supra note 15.
150. Id.
151. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For if the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to
produce a result which it could not command directly.").
152. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1341.
153. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Faced with the possibility of being
denied a registration-or worse, cancellation after years of investment-backed brand
development-new brand owners are more likely to avoid brand names that may be arguably
controversial for fear of later being deemed 'disparaging."').
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Judge Moore also reasoned that the disparaging mark exclusion is a
viewpoint-based denial of private speakers' speech.154 "Underscoring its
hostility to these messages, the government repeatedly assert[ed] in its
briefing before [the Federal Circuit] that it ought to be able to prevent the
registration of 'the most vile racial epithets and images."'15 5 However, this
presents an issue that is viewpoint discriminatory on its face.156 "[Section]
2 does more than discriminate on the basis of topic. It also discriminates
on the basis of message conveyed, 'the idea or message expressed,' [and]
targets 'viewpoints [in] the marketplace.' It does so as a matter of avowed
and undeniable purpose."
With this idea in mind, compare the terms "Think Islam"5 8 and "Stop
the Islamisation of America."l5 9 One is registered for a trademark and one
is not.160 In allowing the registration of "Think Islam" and not "Stop the
Islamisation of America," the government is only allowing registration of
marks that "refer to particular ethnic groups or religions in positive or
neutral ways."'61 These are two different viewpoints and although "Stop
the Islamisation of America" [sic] conveys an idea that can be deemed
hurtful speech and oppresses members of an often-stigmatized community,
the First Amendment still protects hurtful speech.162 Judge Moore also
presented these terms as expressive terms, which are entitled to First
Amendment protection.'63
The government cannot refuse to register disparaging
marks because it disapproves of the expressive messages
conveyed by the marks. It cannot refuse to register marks
because it concludes that such marks will be disparaging to
others. The government regulation at issue amounts to
viewpoint discrimination, and under the strict scrutiny
review appropriate for government regulation of message
154. Volokh, supra note 15.
155. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336 (quoting Appellee's En Banc Br. 1).
156. Volokh, supra note 15.
157. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2227 (2015); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members ofN.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991)).
158. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337.
159. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
160. Id. at 1137, 1328.
161. Id. at 1137.
162. See id at 1328.
163. Id. at 1328.
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or viewpoint, we conclude that the disparagement
proscription of [Section] 2(a) is unconstitutional.'6
Denial of rights based on the content of the message is not content or
viewpoint neutral and will potentially regulate speech in an
unconstitutional manner.165  While Washington Redskins may be
disparaging to a heritage, it is not the government's place to regulate and/or
restrict expression of viewpoints.1 66 The government cannot deem what
gains legal protection through trademark registration.167 If that takes place,
then government endorsement of certain ideas and beliefs is a possibility-
and this is something that the government wanted to avoid.6 8
Judge Moore's strongest reasoning for her holding lies in her belief
that trademark registration is not to be considered "government speech."1 69
As presented by Judge Moore, "Use of a mark by its owner is clearly
private speech."170  A trademark represents a product, goods, and the
source of the product, not the beliefs of the government.171 If the idea that
the registration of a trademark represents the government's endorsement of
a product, then the government endorses cosmetic companies that test on
animals,17 2 products that lead to obesity in Americans,'73 and clothing
brands that may violate workplace discrimination in its hiring processes.174
This Note is not advocating or petitioning for the cancelation in registration
of these marks, but instead is requesting a clearer consistent process by
which the government approves or disapproves an application for
trademark registration. As trademark registration is a regulatory activity, a
simple issuance of certificate of registration for trademarks does not
164. Id.
165. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
166. See id. at 1138.
167. See id
168. See id
169. Id. at 1345.
170. Id.
171. Volokh, supra note 15.
172. Companies That Still Test on Animals, THE VEGETARIAN SITE (last updated Feb. 27,
2016), http://www.thevegetariansite.com/ethicstest.htm.
173. Michael F. Jacobson, McDonald's: Taxing Americans for 56 Years, THE HUFFINGTON
POST (April 15, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-f-jacobson/mcdonalds-
anniversaryb_849299.html.
174. Dave Jamieson, Supreme Court Rules Against Abercrombie & Fitch In Discrimination
Case, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2015, 10:44 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/supreme-court-abercrombie-n-7464534.html.
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constitute government speech, thereby allowing for a bar on free speech
protections.'7 5
As the government, itself, explains, "the USPTO does not endorse any
particular product, service, mark, or registrant" when one registers a
mark.176 In presenting this language, the government removes itself from
the endorsement of any trademark that may be registered. Therefore, the
argument of "government speech" is lost and the Washington Redskins
mark should be considered private speech, not subject to approval or
disapproval by the government through the form of a trademark
registration cancellation. For "decades," the government has maintained
the idea that just as the issuance of a trademark registration "does not
amount to government endorsement of the quality of the goods to which
the mark is applied, the act of registration is not a government ...
pronouncement that the mark is a 'good' one in an aesthetic, or any
analogous, sense."177
This disclaimer provides the notion that the government does not
endorse, nor should it endorse any trademark over another. By simply
applying a regulatory process in approving an application for trademark
registration, the government applies a "one-size-fits-all" objective
approach in its process, thus allowing for the greatest amount of
consistency in approval or disapproval rates of trademarks. Instead of
being fearful that one's mark may not be approved for registration, simply
because it may be deemed to be disparaging by one, a person can rely on
an objective process that will allow his mark to reach the community. A
small panel's opinion should not outweigh a crowd's opinion. The public
should be the ultimate judge on whether a particular mark should be
accepted or not.
V. The Washington Redskins' Fumble, Possible Recovery, and
Moving Forward
The team in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse petitioned for certiorari,
asking the high court to review a decision of a federal district court in
Virginia that upheld the USPTO's cancellation of its Redskins trademarks
175. See Volokh, supra note 15; see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("[A] registered mark's placement on the Principal Register or publication in the PTO's Official
Gazette does not morph the private expression being registered into government expression.").
176. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1347.
177. Id. (quoting In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1219-20 n. 3
(T.T.A.B. 1993)).
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as disparaging to Native Americans. While the case is currently-and
will remain-on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the team
hoped to bypass the Fourth Circuit and be heard alongside the Lee v.
Taml79 litigation. so However, the Redskins have another means for
ensuring that their argument is still heard by the Supreme Court: an
Amicus Brief. The Redskins filed an amicus brief supporting The Slants in
their Tam litigation. 81
On January 18, 2017, the Oral Argument for Lee v. Tam took place
and the justices appeared to look favorably upon the Respondent, Simon
Shiao Tam.182 Therefore, if the oral arguments are a good indicator as to
how the Supreme Court will ultimately decide, the Washington Redskins
may win their future case without even having to go to the Supreme Court.
During the oral arguments, trademark law was compared to that of
copyright law.' 83 Although Justice Kennedy conceded that disparagement
claims would not work with copyright issues, he questioned the Deputy
Solicitor General, Malcolm L. Stewart (presenting on behalf of Petitioner),
and stated, "[D]isparagement clearly wouldn't work with copyright, and-
but [sic] that's a powerful, government program."'84 After this, Mr.
Stewart began to waiver in his argument and said, "If Congress attempted
to prohibit [The Slants], either from having copyright protection or
copyright registration on their music, that would pose a much more
substantial First Amendment issue."'85  After further questioning, Mr.
Stewart stated, "It would be unconstitutional to deny copyright protection
on that ground," as The Slants are "expressing views on social and political
issues. They have a First Amendment right to do that."'86  Although
copyright is a different area of intellectual property law, the values of
maintaining freedom of speech in trademark law remain just as relevant.
178. Supreme Court Declines to Review "Redskins" Trademark Decision, COOLEY (Oct. 3,
2016), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2016/2016-10-03-supreme-court-declines-to-
review-redskins-trademark-decision.
179. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). The case name is now Lee v. Tam and will be,
hereafter, referred to as such.
180. Id.
181. Brief for Pro-Football, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Lee v. Tam, 137
S. Ct. 30 (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/supremecourt_preview/briefs_2016
2017/15-1293_amicus-respfootballinc.authcheckdam.pdf.
182. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argumenttranscripts/2016/15-1293_16gn.pdf.
183. Id. at 3-6.
184. Id.at4.
185. Id
186. Id. at 5.
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While the Washington Redskins could not join on Tam's litigation,
the comparison between the two cases will likely decide the Washington
Redskins case.
Conclusion
Although the Washington Redskins name may be derogatory, it is not
the government's place to determine whether it should receive legal
protection under federal trademark laws. At its core, this is a question of
the government's regulation of speech. Even if a mark was considered
derogatory in the past, a proper argument that the mark is presently
derogatory is necessary to show that the mark will be considered
derogatory in the future.187  It is simply not strong enough to use past
beliefs as an indicator of how a mark is currently perceived or will be
perceived in the future. The idea behind trademark regulation is to protect
the owner's property rights-not to put boundaries on a choice of words
that may or may not be used.'88 If this were the case, then there would be a
severe hindrance on the public's artistic and creative nature in society.
People would be afraid to create and express content, in fear that it will not
be protected, as it may be subjectively deemed disparaging.
In the meantime, the cancellation of the Washington Redskins'
trademark will not go into effect until the team has exhausted the appeals
process in federal court.189 Unless overturned by the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit's decision provides additional freedom for trademark
owners to choose names without hindrance to their creativity. Owners are
free to choose names that will best meet their advertising and/or marketing
plans. Even if the Supreme Court agrees with the cancellation of the
Washington Redskins' mark, the team will still be able to use the name
"Redskins" and "leverage trademark protections under state law."
187. Shapira, supra note 25 ("Armed with fresh data, the Redskins cited a Washington Post
poll, published in May, showing that nine in 10 Native Americans are not bothered by the team's
name. It [] also pointed to a 2004 poll, by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, that found the
same results.").
188. See The Times Editorial Board, Even If the Name 'Redskins'Is Hateful, It Deserves 1st
Amendment Protection, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0504-scotus-redskins-20160504-story.html
("[U]nder the [First] Amendment[,] government may neither outlaw their use or punish
businesses that use such language. The purpose of the trademark system is to protect property
rights, not to establish an index of forbidden words.").
189. Shapira, supra note 100.
190. Id.; see also Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of
Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must A Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 7, 54 (1994)
("If the federal registration of the 'Redskins' trademark is cancelled because the mark disparages
Native Americans, and the common law denies protection to the mark despite its long use in
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However, the protection of this mark-without federal trademark
protection-will be more difficult, as the team will be burdened in its
branding and help "copycats" who want to sell unlicensed merchandise.' 91
This would essentially allow for people to make a profit off of the idea of
another, which federal trademark law is made to prevent and protect
against. 192 In the hopes of protecting creativity and not silencing unwanted
speech, the holding in In re Tam should remain a strong precedent in
upcoming decisions regarding this same issue.
commerce, then the trademark owner would not be able to exclude others from adopting the
mark.").
191. Id.
192. See Justin G. Blankenship, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark:
Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L.
REv. 415, 451 (2001) ("[A]ny mark that is canceled under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act for
being scandalous or disparaging is unlikely to find much protection under common law principles
either, although this will ultimately be determined by state courts applying their own common
law principles."); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and
the Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REv. 187, 232 (2005) ("[A]s immoral, scandalous, and/or disparaging marks may not be
registered under either state or federal law, nor do they enjoy common law protection, there
appears to be no way of establishing a legally recognized property right in these marks.").
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